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WHAT IF THE UK HAD JOINED 
THE EURO IN 1999? 
AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION USING 




This paper attempts to provide a conceptual framework for the analysis of counterfactual 
scenarios using macroeconometric models. As an application we consider UK entry to the 
euro. Entry involves a long-term commitment to restrict UK nominal exchange rates and 
interest rates to be the same as those of the euro area. We derive conditional probability 
distributions for the difference between the future realisations of variables of interest (e.g UK 
and euro area output and prices) subject to UK entry restrictions being fully met over a given 
period and the alternative realisations without the restrictions. The robustness of the results 
can be evaluated by also conditioning on variables deemed to be invariant to UK entry, such 
as oil or US equity prices. Economic interdependence means that such policy evaluation must 
take account of international linkages and common factors that drive fluctuations across 
economies. In this paper this is accomplished using the Global VAR recently developed by 
Dees, di Mauro, Pesaran and Smith (2005). The paper briefly describes the GVAR which has 
been estimated for 25 countries and the euro area over the period 1979-2003. It reports 
probability estimates that output will be higher and prices lower in the UK and the euro area 
as a result of entry. It examines the sensitivity of these results to a variety of assumptions 
about when and how the UK entered and the observed global shocks and compares them with 
the effects of Swedish entry. 
JEL Code: C32, C35, E17, F15, F42. 
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This is a much revised and corrected version of a paper presented at the Conference 
“Macroeconomics and Reality, 25 Years Later”, Barcelona, April 1-2, 2005. We are grateful 
to Stephane Dees and Filippo di Mauro of ECB for helpful discussions on the development of 
the GVAR model used in the present exercise. We have also benefitted from comments by the 
discussants at the conference, Tom Doan and Marco Del Negro, and by Jagjit Chadha, Mardi 
Dungey, Sean Holly, Pravin Trivedi, and Stephen Wright. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In economic analysis it is usually assumed that agents are capable of evaluating
alternative potential outcomes: to answer ‘what if’ questions. Agents often
make decisions by conducting a counterfactual analysis, judging what would
happen under alternative states of the economy. This ability is taken for granted
in strategic games, and in arriving at arbitrage conditions in ﬁnancial markets.
Similarly in economic policy-making, a monetary authority will ask what will
be the outcome if interest rates are left unchanged compared to the outcome if
they are raised or lowered by a certain number of basis points. In policy-making,
such scenarios are usually constructed using an econometric model and the
outcomes may be described in terms of point, interval or probability forecasts.
This paper attempts to provide a conceptual framework for the analysis of such
counterfactuals. The approach is illustrated with a speciﬁce x a m p l et h a th a s
caused considerable controversy, the debate as to whether the UK or Sweden
should adopt the euro. A natural question to ask in this context is whether
output in the UK (Sweden) and euro area (EA), would be higher and prices
lower if the UK had joined the euro in 1999. Given a global econometric model
this is a well deﬁned question that has not, to our knowledge, been given a
quantiﬁed answer. The model we shall use is the Global Vector Autoregression,
GVAR, described in Dees, di Mauro, Pesaran and Smith (2005), DdPS, which is
estimated for 25 countries plus the euro area over the period 1979Q4 to 2003Q4.
Our approach to the counterfactual analysis involves deriving the conditional
probability distributions for the diﬀerences between the future realisations of
variables of interest subject to the restrictions implied by the counterfactual
under consideration and the alternative realisations without such restrictions.
Given a complete econometric model, i.e. with no exogenous variables, with a
vector of endogenous variables xt, one can calculate the multi-period probability
distribution for xT+h conditional on information at time T : f (xT+h |IT ), for
h =1 ,2,...H,w h e r eH is the forecast horizon. The counterfactual scenario, say
the UK or Sweden euro entry, can be viewed as imposing restrictions on the space
of the endogenous variables, ΨxT+j = dT+j,j=1 ,2,..., ¯ H,w h e r eΨ and dT+j
are speciﬁed such as to ensure that UK (Sweden) and EA nominal exchange
rates and interest rates are equalised for a certain number of periods after entry,
and ¯ H is the commitment horizon (typically assumed to be much larger than
H). One can then calculate the probability distribution of xT+h subject to the
long-term entry restrictions, f
¡
xT+h
¯ ¯IT,ΨxT+j = dT+j,j=1 ,2,..., ¯ H
¢
,f o r
h =1 ,2,..,H < ¯ H.
The eﬀect of the entry can then be derived as the probability distribution
of the diﬀerence between the two counterfactuals. Our baseline case looks at
the eﬀect of UK entry in 1999Q1 at par, namely the exchange rate prevailing
in 1998Q4, on output and prices in the UK and EA over the ﬁve years 1999Q1-
2003Q4. To model long-term commitment we impose the entry restrictions for
10 years, and consider the eﬀects of the UK entry over the period 1999Q1-
2003Q4 (ﬁve years). We examine the robustness of our results to a variety
of other assumptions about how the UK joined, when it joined and to the
2realisations of oil prices and US equity and interest rates. A similar analysis is
also carried out for Sweden.
There is a large literature on conditional probability forecasts, e.g. Doan,
Litterman and Sims (1984) and Waggoner and Zha (1999), but our approach is
rather diﬀerent. For instance, when a Central Bank ﬁxes a future path for in-
terest rates to investigate a particular scenario, it usually does this by ﬁxing the
errors in the model so that the required interest path is achieved, but ignores the
covariances between those assumed errors and the errors of the other equations,
which will change other variables. In contrast, our approach allows for the possi-
bility of non-zero covariances. It diﬀers from impulse response function analysis
because it puts the restrictions on the observable variables not the unobservable
shocks, whose interpretation can be problematic. Like conditional forecasting,
the counterfactual analysis can be carried out using the reduced form model,
which renders the analysis invariant to the diﬀerent schemes discussed in the
literature for exact identiﬁcation of the structural shocks.
The issue we are dealing with is similar to that dealt with by models of
potential outcomes introduced in the design of experiments by Neyman (1935)
a n du s e di nt h et r e a t m e n te ﬀect literature. The UK did not join the euro in
1999 and we cannot observe what would have happened had it done so any
more than we can observe what would have happened to Italy had it not joined.
The relation between models of potential outcomes and econometric models
is discussed by Heckman (2000). However, our approach diﬀers in that it ex-
amines alternative distributions generated by a parametric model rather than
making non-parametric comparisons between the observations on those treated
and those not treated. The very small sample means that it is not sensible to
compare the outcomes of the twelve EU members who joined the euro with the
three who stayed out.
Our approach also diﬀers from the type of counterfactuals that are often
contemplated in historical discourses. For example, Fogel (1964) asked: what
might have happened to the US economy if the railroad had not been brought
into use? The standard counterfactual compares the outcome of the hypotheti-
cal alternative scenario to what actually happened. The former can be viewed as
restricted forecasts, and as with all forecasts can be subject to signiﬁcant errors,
thus making it diﬃcult to distinguish the eﬀects of the restrictions (the coun-
terfactuals) from the forecasts errors associated with the econometric model.
Our approach avoids this problem by evaluating the probability distribution of
the diﬀerence between two counterfactuals, one with and one without the re-
strictions imposed. The particular aspect of the probability distribution that
we look at is the probability that GDP in the UK and the EA would have been
higher and prices lower had the UK joined the euro at the beginning of 1999.
We phrase this question in terms of probabilities rather than point forecasts
because measurement of such eﬀects is inherently uncertain.
There is a vast literature on various aspects of the euro, including the mas-
sive research project conducted by the UK Treasury involving many independent
academics published as HMT (2003), but none of it seems to address the par-
ticular question we pose. Much of the analysis has been preoccupied with the
3eﬀects on the UK. We look at the eﬀe c t so nb o t ht h eU Ka n dt h eE A ,s i n c e
they are very interdependent. The EA is the UK’s largest trading partner ac-
counting for 53.7% of its trade, compared to 18% for the US, but the UK is also
the EA’s largest trading partner, accounting for 23.8% of its trade as compared
with 22.7% for the US, see Table 1. Thus UK entry could have important eﬀects
on the EA.
Table 1: Trade Weights Based on Direction of Trade Statistics
Country/ Rest of W. Europe Rest*
Region US EA China Japan UK Sweden Switz. Norway
US 0.000 0.155 0.073 0.124 0.052 0.008 0.012 0.004 0.571
EA 0.227 0.000 0.056 0.072 0.238 0.057 0.090 0.028 0.232
China 0.236 0.164 0.000 0.248 0.029 0.010 0.007 0.003 0.304
Japan 0.319 0.132 0.128 0.000 0.032 0.007 0.009 0.003 0.371
UK 0.180 0.537 0.020 0.042 0.000 0.027 0.028 0.023 0.143
Sweden 0.104 0.517 0.025 0.035 0.115 0.000 0.017 0.099 0.088
Switz. 0.113 0.670 0.015 0.039 0.066 0.015 0.000 0.004 0.079
Norway 0.090 0.449 0.020 0.030 0.181 0.132 0.008 0.000 0.089
Note: Trade weights are computed as shares of exports and imports displayed in rows
by region such that a row, but not a column, sums to one. *“Rest” gathers the remaining
countries. This Table has been reproduced from Table 2 in Dees, di Mauro, Pesaran and
Smith (2005).
Economic interdependence means that policy evaluation of alternative sce-
narios must take account of international linkages and common factors which
drive business cycle ﬂuctuations. Thus, to conduct the counterfactual that we
have in mind requires a global macroeconometric model which contains speciﬁc
models for the euro area and the UK, allows for nominal exchange rates and
interest rates to be equalised and can calculate the probability distributions for
the endogenous variables multiple periods ahead, with and without the restric-
tions implied by the counterfactuals. The GVAR described in detail in DdPS
allows us to do this. It is estimated over 1979Q4 to 2003Q4, so the parameter
estimates embody information after the introduction of the euro. It is exactly
the version described there. It has not been adjusted for this particular exer-
cise. An earlier version of the GVAR is described in Pesaran, Schuermann and
Weiner (2004).
To examine the eﬀect of entry on levels of output and prices in the UK
and the EA, a model which distinguishes between the EA and other countries
is essential since we need to ﬁx the UK nominal interest rate and exchange
rate relative to the ones in EA, while letting the EA (now including the UK)
interest rate and exchange rate to vary against other economies. Models which
are based on indices of eﬀective exchange rates are not suitable for this purpose.
The experience of the EA would have been diﬀerent under UK entry, because
4the UK has strong trading links with the EA. Therefore changes in UK economic
performance would have feedback eﬀects on the EA. The GVAR allows for this,
so the impact on the EA of UK entry can be computed.
The approach developed in this paper could be used to examine a range of
other counterfactuals, e.g. the new entrants to the EU joining the euro, the
possibility of China pegging her currency to the yen rather than to the US
dollar, or the eﬀects of a policy committed to holding interest rates unchanged
over a given period.
In the rest of the paper we brieﬂy describe the historical background to the
creation of the euro, provide an overview of the GVAR, present a framework for
the analysis of counterfactuals starting with a simple illustration. We explain
how we model entry and derive the probability distribution of the eﬀects of entry
under diﬀerent scenarios, and ﬁnally preset the main results for the eﬀects of
UK and Sweden entries, separately.
2 Historical Background
A central theme in European economic policy in the last quarter of the twen-
tieth century was the need to reduce exchange rate volatility. After the break-
down of Bretton Woods, there were various attempts to reduce exchange rate
ﬂuctuations between European countries, culminating in June 1988, when the
European Council conﬁrmed the objective of Economic and Monetary Union,
EMU. It established the Delors Committee which proposed a three stage process
to EMU. Stage 1 started on 1 July 1990, Stage 2, with an embryonic Central
Bank, the European Monetary Institute, started on 1 January 1994. Stage 3
started with the adoption of the euro as a virtual currency on 1 January 1999.
Eleven countries ﬁxed their exchange rates to the euro and adopted common
interest rates. Greece joined on 1 January 2001. Euro notes and coins entered
circulation in January 2002.
D u r i n gt h es a m ep e r i o d ,ac e n t r a lt h e m ei nU Ke c o n o m i cp o l i c yw a st h e
control of inﬂation. Money supply targeting was tried in the late 1970s and early
1980s but failed. The target then switched to the exchange rate, ﬁrst informally
under Chancellor Lawson who shadowed the DM, then formally after October
1990 through membership of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, ERM.
The UK and Italy were ejected from the ERM by a large speculative attack in
September 1992. Italy later returned to the ERM and joined the euro while the
UK began a period of inﬂation targeting.
The Labour Party was elected in 1997. In opposition, it knew that if elected
to government it would have to establish credibility. Keegan (2003) provides
an account of the development of Labour party economic policy. During the
election campaign, Labour had tried to establish that it would follow a prudent
ﬁscal policy by committing itself to the public expenditure plans of the previous
Conservative government. It also needed to establish that it would follow a
prudent monetary policy. There were two obvious routes: rejoining the ERM
and subsequently the euro or making the Bank of England independent. Neither
5could have been put in the election manifesto and either could in economic terms
be regarded as providing a plausible nominal anchor. In the event, it chose Bank
of England independence. To join the euro the UK would have had to meet a
set of ﬁve convergence criteria. Four of them it easily met: government deﬁcit
below 3% of GDP, government debt below 60% of GDP, inﬂa t i o nl e s st h a n1 . 5 %
above the three best performing states, and long interest rates less than 2%
above the three best performing states. The ﬁfth, membership of the exchange
rate mechanism without severe tensions for at least two years, would have been
more diﬃcult to meet, but might have been waived by the other members.
To determine policy towards the euro, the Labour Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer, Gordon Brown, in a Statement on Economic and Monetary Union on
October 27 1997 (available on http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk) proposed ﬁve
economic tests:
“1. Whether there can be sustainable convergence between Britain and the economies
of a single currency;
2. Whether there is suﬃcient ﬂexibility to cope with economic change;
3. The eﬀect on investment;
4. The impact on our ﬁnancial services industry, and;
5 .W h e t h e ri ti sg o o df o re m p l o y m e n t . "
Some questioned the economic coherence, as distinct from the political ra-
tionale, of these tests and in any event they were about conditions for entry, not
about what the outcome would be if the UK did enter, which is the question
that concerns us in this paper.
3A n O v e r v i e w o f t h e G V A R
Suppose there are N +1countries indexed by i =0 ,1,2,...,N,w i t hc o u n t r y
0, the US, as the reference country. The DdPS version of the GVAR covers 33
countries, 25 treated separately, the remainder grouped into the euro area. For
simplicity we will refer to the EA as a country. A second-order country-speciﬁc
VARX*(2,2) model with deterministic trends can be written as




for i =0 ,1,...,N,w h e r e˚ xit is a ki × 1 (usually ﬁve or six) vector of country-
speciﬁcv a r i a b l e s ,˚ x∗
it,ak∗
i × 1 vector of foreign variables speciﬁct oc o u n t r yi,
Φi1 and Φi2 are ki×ki matrix of lagged coeﬃcients, Ψi0, Ψi1 and Ψi2 are ki×k∗
i
matrix of coeﬃcients associated with the foreign-speciﬁcv a r i a b l e s ,a n d˚ uit is a
ki×1 vector of idiosyncratic country-speciﬁc shocks. All the 26 country-speciﬁc
models in the GVAR are estimated over the period 1979Q4-2003Q4.
The variables ˚ xit are a ki × 1 subset of the logarithm of real output, yit;
inﬂation, πit = pit − pit−1, where pit is the logarithm of a price index; the
real exchange rate, which we deﬁne as eit − pit, where eit is the logarithm




it is a short interest rate measured in percent per
annum; a long interest rate, rL
it =0 .25log(1 + RL
it/100); and the logarithm of
6real equity prices, qit. The variables included in the diﬀerent country models
are not always the same, e.g. there are no equity price or long-term interest
rate data for some.
The lag orders are selected by AIC separately for each country up to a
maximum of 2. The US, the reference country, is treated diﬀerently. Oil prices
are included in the US model as an endogenous variable but included in other
country models as weakly exogenous. In contrast, exchange rates (in terms of
US dollars) are included as endogenous variables in all country models except
for the US model. Also all foreign variables are included in the non-US models
as weakly exogenous variables, but only foreign real output and foreign inﬂation
are included as weakly exogenous in the US model.
The country speciﬁc models in the GVAR could be derived from structural
models. Most theoretical models have VARs as reduced forms. For example,
solution of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models can be
approximated by VAR’s with restrictions on the coeﬃcients. But a formal link
up of the GVAR with multi-country DSGE models will be beyond the scope of
the present paper.
The foreign variables ˚ x∗
it are calculated as country speciﬁct r a d ew e i g h t e d





wij˚ xjt, with wii =0
where wij is the share of country j in the trade (exports plus imports) of country
i. The ˚ x∗
it are treated as weakly exogenous, an assumption found acceptable,
when tested. A summary of the trade-weight matrix is given in Table 1. The
VARX* models can be estimated separately for each country, taking into ac-
count the possibility of cointegration between˚ xit and˚ x∗
it. Including the country
speciﬁc world averages, ˚ x∗
it, also reduces between-groups dependence in the er-
rors. In the VARX* only the just identifying restrictions are imposed on the
cointegrating vectors. It is worth noting that the outcome does not depend on
the precise form of the just identifying restrictions.
Although estimation is done on a country by country basis, the GVAR model
is solved for the world as a whole, taking account of the fact that all the variables
are endogenous to the system as a whole. To do this (1) can be written as
Ai0˚ zit = hi0 + hi1t + Ai1˚ zit−1 + Ai2˚ zit−2 +˚ uit, (2)









Ai0 =( Iki,−Ψi0), Ai1 =( Φi1,Ψi1), Ai2 =( Φi2,Ψi2).
7The dimensions of Ai0, Ai1 and Ai2 are ki ×(ki +k∗
i ) and Ai0 has full column
rank, namely Rank(Ai0)=ki. Also note that
˚ zit= Wi˚ xt,
where˚ xt =( ˚ x0
0t,˚ x0
1t,...,˚ x0
Nt)0 is the k×1 vector which collects all the endogenous
variables of the system, and Wi is the (ki +k∗
i )×k matrix deﬁned by the trade
weights wij. Using this (2) can be written as
Ai0Wi˚ xt = hi0 + hi1t + Ai1Wi˚ xt−1+Ai2Wi˚ xt−2 +˚ uit, for i =0 ,1,2,...,N,
(3)
and the systems stacked to yield the model for˚ xt




































for j =0 ,1,2.S i n c e H0 is a known non-singular matrix that depends on the
trade weights and parameter estimates, we can obtain the GVAR
˚ xt = a0+a1t + G1˚ xt−1 + G2˚ xt−2 +˚ vt, (4)
where Gj= H
−1
0 Hj, aj = H
−1
0 hj,f o rj =0 ,1,2,a n d˚ vt = H
−1
0 ˚ ut.T h eG V A R
can be solved recursively and used for a variety of purposes.
There are no restrictions on the covariance matrix Σ = E(˚ vt˚ v0
t).F o r e a c h
c o u n t r yw eh a v eaki × 1 vector of estimated residuals b ˚ uit from which can be
calculated b ˚ vit and the elements of the covariance matrix are estimated freely by
the ki × kj matrix b Σij =
P
t b ˚ vitb ˚ v
0
jt/T.
The model has 134 endogenous variables 71 stochastic trends and 63 coin-
tegrating relations. A full description of the model properties including an
analysis of its stability is given in DdPS. Although linear with a simple overall
structure, this is a large and complicated model which allows for a large degree
of interdependence. There are two routes for between country interdependence,
through the impact of the˚ x∗
it variables and through the covariances. The eﬀects
through the ˚ x∗
it are generally large, shocks to one country have marked eﬀects
on other countries. The between country covariances are quite small, with the
exception of those for the real exchange rate equations, perhaps because of the
base-country eﬀect, since they are all expressed against the US dollar.
4 A Framework for Counterfactual Analysis
4.1 A Simple Illustration
Before presenting our counterfactual framework for the analysis of UK entry it
might be helpful to consider a simple illustration where we focus only on two
8variables, x1 and x2 in the context of a one-period commitment problem. Sup-
pose that in the absence of interventions the variables (x1, x2) have a bivariate








Denote the corresponding random variables after the intervention by x∗
1 and x∗
2,
and suppose that the objective of the intervention is to ensure x∗
1 = x∗
2,1 with
the post-intervention variables being no more volatile than the pre-intervention
ones, namely V (x∗
1) ≤ V (x1) and V (x∗
2) ≤ V (x2).2 To clarify the role of
these optimality conditions in deriving our proposed solution we introduce the
intervention variables η1 and η2 so that
x∗
1 = µ1 + η1 + u1,
x∗
2 = µ2 + η2 + u2,
and η1 and η2 are such that
η1 − η2 = µ2 − µ1 + u2 − u1. (5)
Clearly, without further restrictions, there are many possible forms of interven-
tions that could satisfy (5). For example, intervention could only aﬀect x2 and
not x1,w i t hx1 realised ﬁrst and then x2 set to equal x1.U n d e r t h i s s e t u p
η1 =0 ,a n dη2 = µ1 − µ2 + u1 − u2 so that x∗
1 and x∗
2 both will be distributed
as N(µ1,σ2
1). But such an intervention need not be optimal since it does not
necessarily ensure that V (x∗
1) ≤ V (x1) and V (x∗
2) ≤ V (x2).
Under the above set up and noting that x1 and x2 are jointly normally
distributed, the mean and variance of x∗
1 (or x∗
2)a r eg i v e nb y 3
E(x∗
1)=E (x1 |x1 − x2 =0)=µ1 +
Cov(x1,x 1 − x2)
V (x1 − x2)
[0 − (µ1 − µ2)],
and
V (x∗
1)=V (x1 |x1 − x2 =0)=V (x1) −
Cov(x1,x 1 − x2)Cov(x1 − x2,x 1)
V (x1 − x2)
,


















1Note that by construction x∗
1 = x∗
2 = x∗, where x∗ is also normally distributed under our
assumptions.
2In the context of more structured problems, one could also employ utility-based optimality
conditions. However, to the extent that lower volatilities are welfare enhancing our statistical
approach can be reconciled with alternative utility-based procedures.
3Recall that for normally distributed random variables we have














It is also easily veriﬁed that V (x∗
i) ≤ V (xi) for i =1 ,2, as required.
















. To prove this result consider the following convex combination of the
random variables x1 and x∗
1
z = λx1 +( 1− λ)x∗
1,
where λ is a scalar in the range 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Since under our intervention rule
V (x∗
1) ≤ V (x1), hence the value of λ that minimizes V (z) must be zero. From
the ﬁrst order condition for the minimization of V (z) with respect to λ,t h e
optimal value of λ,s a yλ





























4.2 Modeling of Entry
The illustrative model of the above section is static and focuses on a single
period where the forecast and the commitment periods are the same. But in
the case of dynamic models, as noted in the introduction, it is important that
a distinction is made between the forecast horizon and the commitment period.
Let H denote the forecast horizon, h =1 ,2,...,H, and ¯ H the commitment
horizon, j =1 ,2,..., ¯ H, such that H<¯ H. The choice of ¯ H would typically
depend on the nature and the expected durability of the commitment. In what
follows we take H and ¯ H as given. In the empirical applications we ensure that
¯ H is suﬃciently large relative to H.
Also the GVAR includes as endogenous variables in ˚ xt the real exchange
rates and rates of inﬂation of the various countries. To analyse the eﬀect of
UK entry we need to transform the model to explain a new set of endogenous
variables xt which include the levels of prices and nominal exchange rates. We
treat a counterfactual as a restriction on the space of endogenous variables, xt.
In this case the restriction is the equality between UK and EA nominal exchange
rates and interest rates. For entry at the end of period T (e.g. 1998Q4), the
restrictions can be written in the form: ΨxT+j = dT+j,j=1 ,2,..., ¯ H. where
the restrictions embodied in Ψ and dT+j are deﬁned by the counterfactual.
UK entry imposes two restrictions on the endogenous variables. We can then





¯ ¯IT,ΨxT+j = dT+j,j=1 ,2,..., ¯ H
¢
,f o rh =
1,2,...,H < ¯ H. The diﬀerence in these expected values is our point estimate
10of the eﬀects of the counterfactual, UK entry. We also derive the variance-
covariance matrix of the diﬀerence for each horizon. Assuming joint normality,
this allows us to make probability statements about the eﬀects of entry on events,
for example that UK GDP will be higher, and joint probability statements, e.g.
that UK GDP will be higher and UK prices lower across the diﬀerent horizons.
The advantage of the GVAR in this exercise is that it can consistently allow
for a large degree of interdependence through a variety of channels within a
coherent structure. One disadvantage for exposition is that the linkages in
the GVAR are complex. We assume that the parameters of the model remain
constant at the values estimated from the historical sample. The stochastic
trends in the model mean that the variance of the forecast xT+h increases at
the rate, h, thus the forecasts themselves are likely to have large standard errors
which will increase with the horizon. The estimates of the eﬀect of entry, the
diﬀerence between two forecasts, will have smaller variances than the forecasts,
but the variance of the eﬀect of entry will also increase at the rate, h. To
allow for this uncertainty we will focus on the probability of particular events.
Speciﬁcally, we consider the probability that output in the UK and EA will be
higher with entry, that prices will be lower and the joint probability of higher
output and lower prices.
With the above considerations in mind, suppose that UK joins euro at the
end of date T with the commitment (agreed by the euro area and UK authorities
jointly) that UK’s nominal exchange rate, E2,T+j, and short term interest rate,
rS
2,T+j,w i l lb eﬁxed at the corresponding euro values over the commitment
period j =1 ,2,..., ¯ H.4 Since in the GVAR all exchange rates are measured
with respect to the US dollar, the alignment of nominal exchange rates between







where γ denotes the £/euro rate at which UK joins the euro. The case of γ =1
implies entry at par, i.e nominal £/euro rate being equivalent to that at the end
of period T. Clearly entry at a diﬀerent exchange rate can also be entertained.
In the case, for example, of a UK entry with a rate which is 10% (say) below the
£/euro at the end of period T, γ =0 .90. Taking logs, (6) may also be written
e2,T+j − e1,T+j = e2T − e1T +l n ( γ),f o rj =1 ,2,..., ¯ H. (7)
For short term interest rates we have
rS
2,T+j = rS
1,T+j for j =1 ,2,..., ¯ H. (8)
To work out the eﬀects of UK entry we shall consider two multi-period
forecast scenarios: (i) the forecasts of xT+h,h=1 ,2,...,H in the absence
of a UK entry, (ii) forecasts in the presence of a UK entry. This could be
done either in terms of point or probability forecasts that allow for parameter
4In what follows we denote UK and euro variables by the subscripts ‘2’ and ‘1’, respectively.
11and/or model uncertainty. Under entry at 1999Q1, we further consider forecasts
conditional on the realisations of four variables namely, oil prices (endogenous
to the US model), US equity prices and US short and long term interest rates.
As mentioned at the outset, it is unlikely that UK entry would have any eﬀect
on these particular variables.
As noted earlier, the GVAR uses real exchange rates as a variable, but
to model entry we need to ﬁx nominal exchange rates. The solution of the
GVAR given by (4) can be expressed in terms of the price level and the nominal
exchange rate yielding the equation
xt = b0 + b1t + F1xt−1 + F2xt−2+F3xt−3+vt, (9)
where





, F2 = B(G2B−1 − G1B−1C), F3 = −BG2B−1C.
The details of this procedure and the precise relationship between xt and ˚ xt,
deﬁned by (1), can be found in the Appendix where for expositional convenience
the ﬁrst three countries in the k×1 vector xt =( x0
0t,x0
1t,...,x0
Nt)0 are ordered as
US, EA and UK respectively, followed by the remaining. Similarly, in all country
models, xit,t h eﬁrst variable is the price level pit and, with the exception of the
US, the second and third entries in xit are the nominal exchange rate, eit, and
the short term interest rate, rS
it, followed by the remaining.
Using (9), the point forecasts under (i) (in the absence of UK entry) are
given recursively by
µh = ˆ b0 + ˆ b1 (T + h)+ˆ F1µh−1 + ˆ F2µh−2 + ˆ F3µh−3,f o rh =1 ,2,...,H (10)
with the initial values µ0 = xT, µ−1 = xT−1 and µ−2 = xT−2,w h e r e
ˆ F1 =
³
C + Bˆ G1B−1
´
, ˆ F2 = B(ˆ G2B−1 − ˆ G1B−1C), ˆ F3 = −Bˆ G2B−1C,
ˆ b0 = Bˆ a0,ˆ b1 = Bˆ a1
and ˆ a0, ˆ a1, ˆ G1 and ˆ G2 are obtained from the individual country estimates using
the GVAR modeling framework (described in Section 3).





































Xt = FXt−1 + Dt + Vt.
Hence














Therefore, conditional on the initial values, XT, and in the absence of entry
xT+h |IT ∼ N(µh,Ωhh), (12)
where µh is given by5





















and Σ = BCov(˚ vT+h−i)B0. The covariance of ˚ vt can be estimated using the
residuals of the global model, (4).
4.3 Point and Probability Forecasts Conditional on UK
Entry
Under UK entry, forecasts of the global model must be obtained subject to the
entry restrictions (7) and (8) which can also be written more generally as
ΨxT+j = dT+j,j=1 ,2,..., ¯ H (16)
where Ψ is a suitably deﬁned l × k matrix and dT+j is a l × 1 vector of known
constants. In the case of the entry restrictions (7) and (8) we have l =2 ,
dT+j =
µ















01×k0 0 −1001×(k1−3) 01001×(k2−3) 01×(k−k0−k1−k2)




5µh can can also be computed using the recursions (10).






¯ ¯IT,ΨxT+j = dT+j,j=1 ,2,..., ¯ H
¢
.
In deriving these expectations we assume that the announcement of the entry
restrictions does not aﬀect the GVAR parameters, Fi,i=1 ,2,3 and Σ.6
First note that, using (11), we have







ξT+h |IT ∼ N(0,Ωhh),
where Ωhh is given by (14). The entry restrictions now imply that
ΨξT+j = dT+j − Ψµj for j =1 ,2,..., ¯ H. (19)
Setting gj = dT+j − Ψµj ∀j, (19) can be written as
(I ¯ H⊗Ψ)˜ ξ ¯ H= ˜ g ¯ H,



















ξT+h|IT,(I ¯ H⊗Ψ)˜ ξ ¯ H= ˜ g ¯ H
´
=( s0
h ¯ H⊗Ik)˜ Ω ¯ H(I ¯ H⊗Ψ
0)[(I ¯ H⊗Ψ)˜ Ω ¯ H(I ¯ H⊗Ψ
0)]−1˜ g ¯ H,
where sh ¯ H is a ¯ H × 1 selection vector with unity as its hth element and zeros
elsewhere, and ˜ Ω ¯ H is the k ¯ H × k ¯ H matrix




Ω11 Ω12 ··· Ω1 ¯ H










The diagonal elements of ˜ Ω ¯ H,t h a ti s{Ωii}
¯ H
i=1, are given by (14), while the















6Other possibilities can also be entertained. But we do not believe there are suﬃcient
grounds to make ap r i o r iassumptions about the way some of the parameters might change
as a result of the UK entry. The general issue of parameter and model uncertainty does,
however, deserve further attention.
14where ˜ Σ is deﬁned by (15).
Hence, point forecasts under UK entry restrictions are given by
µ∗
h = µh +( s0
h ¯ H⊗Ik)˜ Ω ¯ H(I ¯ H⊗Ψ
0)[(I ¯ H⊗Ψ)˜ Ω ¯ H(I ¯ H⊗Ψ
0)]−1˜ g ¯ H. (20)
It is easily seen that µ∗
h satisfy the entry restrictions, namely Ψµ
∗
h = dT+h.T o
s e et h i sn o t et h a t
Ψ(s0
h ¯ H⊗Ik)=( 1 ⊗Ψ)(s0
h ¯ H⊗Ik)=( s0
h ¯ H⊗Ψ)=( s0
h ¯ H⊗I2)(I ¯ H⊗Ψ),
and (s0
h ¯ H⊗I2)˜ g ¯ H = gh = dT+h−Ψµh. Recall that under UK entry restrictions
Ψ is 2 × k.
For future reference also note that the mean eﬀects of UK entry are given
by
µ∗
h − µh =( s0
h ¯ H⊗Ik)˜ Ω ¯ H(I ¯ H⊗Ψ
0)[(I ¯ H⊗Ψ)˜ Ω ¯ H(I ¯ H⊗Ψ
0)]−1˜ g ¯ H. (21)
4.4 Probability Distribution of the Eﬀects of UK Entry
Let x∗
T+h be the values of xT+h under UK entry
x∗
T+h = µh + ξ
∗
T+h,h =1 ,2,...,H
where µh is given by (13) and ξ
∗
T+h is the random variable deﬁned by the prob-







¯ ¯ ¯(I ¯ H⊗Ψ)˜ ξ ¯ H= ˜ g ¯ H, (22)
for h =1 ,2,...,H < ¯ H.7 The eﬀects of UK entry in this case are given by
δT+h = x∗
T+h − xT+h = ξ
∗
T+h − ξT+h
The mean eﬀects are
E (δT+h |IT )=µ∗
h − µh.




































h ¯ H⊗Ik)˜ Ω ¯ H(I ¯ H⊗Ψ0)[(I ¯ H⊗Ψ)˜ Ω ¯ H(I ¯ H⊗Ψ0)]−1(I ¯ H⊗Ψ)˜ Ω ¯ H(sh ¯ H⊗Ik),
(25)
7To simplify the notations we are suppressing the dependence of ξ∗
T+h on ¯ H. Strictly
speaking, we should write ξ∗
T+h, ¯ H.
8Similarly, we suppress the dependence of Ω∗
hh on ¯ H.







, recall that conditional on IT the k × 1
random vector ξ
∗









hh. Let ˜ Ψ0
¯ H = ˜ Ω
1/2
¯ H (I ¯ H⊗Ψ0) and note that
Ω∗
hh deﬁned by (25) can alternatively be expressed as
Ω∗
hh = Ωhh − (s0
h ¯ H⊗Ik)˜ Ω
1/2
¯ H P ¯ H ˜ Ω
1/2
¯ H (sh ¯ H⊗Ik),
where
P ¯ H = ˜ Ψ0
¯ H
³
˜ Ψ ¯ H ˜ Ψ0
¯ H
´−1
˜ Ψ ¯ H,




h ¯ H⊗Ik)˜ Ω
1/2
¯ H P ¯ H ˜ Ω
1/2
¯ H (sh ¯ H⊗Ik).
is a positive semi-deﬁnite matrix.
As illustrated in Section 4.1, by considering the convex combination of the
random variables q0ξT+h and q0ξ
∗















Using this result in (26) the variance of the eﬀects of UK entry is derived as
V(δT+h |I T)=Ωhh − Ω∗
hh ≥ 0
which is a positive semi-deﬁnite matrix. Hence,
δT+h |I T ∼ N(µ∗
h − µh, Ωhh − Ω∗
hh). (27)
4.5 Conditioning on US variables
When conditioning on the realisations of the four variables in the US model, a
new 4 × k restriction matrix Ψa is deﬁned and imposed under both the case of
no entry and UK entry. If the rest of the variables in the US are ordered as
xrest
0t =( y0t,q 0t,rL









Unlike the entry restrictions that are committed to extend beyond the forecast
horizon, H, conditioning on the realisations of xrest
0t is only possible when such
realisations are in fact available. Therefore, the analysis of this section is only
applicable when the entry date is assumed to be prior to the end of the available
sample.
Assuming that the observations xrest
0t , t = T +1 ,....,T + h are given, the
associated restrictions can be written as
(IH ⊗ Ψa)˜ ξH = ˜ gaH,










aH)0,w h e r egah =
da,T+h − Ψaµh, da,T+h =( rS
0,T+h,qS
0,T+h,r L
0,T+h,oil T+h)0. For these set of
restrictions the point forecasts under no entry are given by
µ∗






where shH is a H × 1 vector of zeros with its hth element set to unity.
Point forecasts under UK entry plus the US restrictions are given by
µ∗
bh = µh +( s0
h ¯ H⊗Ik)˜ Ω ¯ H ˜ Ψ0
b(˜ Ψb˜ Ω ¯ H ˜ Ψ0
b)−1˜ gb, (29)

























The mean eﬀects of committed UK entry are then given by the diﬀerence
µ∗
bh − µ∗
ah. Conditional on the realisations of the variables in the US model,
denoting x∗
a,T+h and x∗
b,T+h the values of xT+h under no entry and UK entry,
respectively, we have
x∗
i,T+h = µh + ξ
∗
i,T+h, for i = a,b,
where µh is given by (13), ξ
∗
a,T+h is the random variables deﬁned by the prob-
ability distribution of ξT+h conditional on
©





b,T+h is the vector of random variables deﬁned by ξT+h conditional on
˜ Ψb˜ ξ ¯ H = ˜ gb,w h e r e˜ Ψb and ˜ gb are as deﬁned above.





a,T+h and we have










































ih, for i = a,b,
with
Ω∗
ah = Ωhh − (s0
hH⊗Ik)˜ ΩH ˜ Ψ0
a
³




17where ˜ Ψa =( IH⊗Ψa),a n d
Ω∗
bh = Ωhh − (s0
h ¯ H⊗Ik)˜ Ω ¯ H ˜ Ψ0
b(˜ Ψb˜ Ω ¯ H ˜ Ψ0
b)−1 ˜ Ψb˜ Ω ¯ H(sh ¯ H⊗Ik).




w h i c hc a nb es h o w nt ob eap o s i t i v es e m i - d e ﬁnite matrix. Hence,





5E s t i m a t e s o f t h e E ﬀects of UK Entry
5.1 Interest and Exchange Rate Co-movements
Euro entry involves restricting UK and EA interest rates and the rate of change
of their exchange rate to be equal. To judge the feasibility of such a scenario
it is worth examining the co-movements of interest rates and exchange rates
of UK and the EA, particularly before the euro was formed. Figures 1 and 2
plot UK and EA short interest rates (in percent per annum) and exchange rate
changes (in percent) from 1979Q1 to 2003Q4. Before 1999 the EA measures
are PPP GDP weighted average of values for the largest eight EA members.
The exchange rate measures are quarterly percentage changes of the EA and
UK exchange rate against the US dollar. The UK and the EA series follow
each other quite closely. The rate of change of exchange rates are I(0). But
using a variety of tests, including the GLS and Weighted Symmetric versions
o ft h eA D F ,o n ec a n n o tr e j e c tau n i tr o o ti nt h eU Ka n dE Ai n t e r e s tr a t e s .
However, they cointegrate, one can reject a unit root in the diﬀerence between
interest rates. There has clearly been strong historical relationships between the
interest rates and exchange rates of the two economies, and the patterns of these
co-movements do not indicate any fundamental diﬃculty with equalization of
either interest rates or exchange rates.




























































































































As can be seen from the graphs UK short-term interest rates were above euro
area rates from the establishment of the euro, ranging from above 3% higher
19at the start of the euro, dropping to a quarter of a percent higher in 2002Q4
increasing to one percent higher by 2003Q4, and 2.75% higher in 2005. The
euro-sterling rate in January 1999 was 1.4, and stayed above this rate for the
whole of the subsequent period; exceeding 1.7 in parts of 2000, then falling back
towards 1.4.
5.2 Alternative Scenarios for the UK
Our base-line case considers entry in 1999Q1 and uses the GVAR to calculate
probability distributions for the 5 years ahead to 2003Q4, with and without UK
entry. We focus on output and the price level in the EA and UK. EA always
refers to the existing euro area. Entry is assumed to be at par, the exchange
rate prevailing in 1998Q4, with a long-term commitment to euro membership.
We model the long-term commitment by imposing the restrictions for ten years,
40 quarters, at least twice the forecast hor i z o n .E x t e n d i n gi tt o5 6q u a r t e r s( t h e
maximum number of quarters our computer codes can run on our pc) makes
virtually no diﬀerence to the results. For practical considerations, as a ﬁrst
approximation, it is assumed that the parameters of the model are invariant to
the nature of the commitment. The nature of the commitment does, however,
aﬀect the conditional forecasts (and expectations). Given that joining is such
a major decision, it is not something that one would commit to on a period by
period basis.9
We describe our results in terms of the probability of the eﬀect of entry,
δT+h = x∗
T+h − xT+h, having a particular sign. This takes account both of
t h es i z eo ft h ee ﬀect and its standard error. We are examining the probability
distribution of the diﬀerence between two counterfactuals from the GVAR. We
are not comparing our estimates with what actually happened over the period
1999Q1-2003Q4 to the UK and EA. Although we can estimate the shocks to the
UK and EA without UK entry from the residuals of the model, we do not know
what they would be with entry. There is no reason to suppose that they would
be the same as without entry. This exercise is quite diﬀerent from standard
approaches such as impulse response analysis, and prior expectations based on
such approaches may not be appropriate.
We compare this base-line case with various other scenarios. The ﬁrst alter-
native considers entry at par in 1999Q1, but conditions on observed values of oil
prices, US interest rates and US equity prices over the period 1999Q1-2003Q4.
The second alternative has the UK entering the euro in 2004Q1 at par, the
exchange rate in 2003Q4, and calculates the eﬀects from 2004Q1 to 2008Q4 to
examine the eﬀect of initial conditions. The third alternative considers the ef-
fects diﬀerent patterns of appreciation or depreciation have on entry in 1999Q1.
Finally, for comparison we consider Swedish entry.
9As noted earlier these results are invariant to identiﬁcation, in the sense that they would
be exactly the same whatever set of just identifying set of restrictions one chose to impose on
the underlying country-speciﬁcm o d e l s .
205.3 UK Entry at Par
Our base-line case has the UK entering the euro from the start at parity, the
exchange rate prevailing in 1998Q4. In 1998Q4 UK short interest rates were
6.75% per annum compared to euro area short rates of 3.5% per annum. Table
2 and Figure 3 show the probability that UK and EA interest rates would
have been lower with entry than without entry. The probability that UK short
interest rates are lower with entry than without starts at almost exactly one and
drifts down steadily to 76% in 2003Q4. The probability that EA interest rates
are lower as a result of entry starts at zero (interest rates are certain to have
been higher), rises sharply to peak at 94% in 2000Q1, then falls steadily to 44%
in 2003Q4. The lower UK interest rates would tend to cause output to rise but
this is oﬀset by the exchange rate eﬀect. Under no entry the UK is expected to
depreciate against the euro, so relative to no entry sterling appreciates against
the euro. We examine the exchange rate eﬀects further below.
Table 2: Probability Estimates that UK and EA Short-Term























21Figure 3: Probability Estimates that UK and EA Short-Term
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The eﬀects on GDP and prices are shown in Table 3. Figure 4 shows esti-
mates of the probability that UK and EA GDP are higher, Figure 5 the proba-
bility that prices are lower. The probability that UK GDP is higher as a result
of entry starts very small, then increases peaking after four years at 62%, then
starting to fall again to 58% in 2003Q4. The probability that EA GDP is higher
as a result of entry also starts very small then increases steadily, reaching 46%
in 2003Q4. The probability that UK prices will be lower with entry starts high,
then falls steadily, reaching 66% in 2003Q4. The probability that EA prices will
be lower starts at 47%, falls to 7% after a year, then rises to 17% by 2003Q4.
The joint probability of higher GDP and lower prices in the UK starts close
to zero and rises rapidly at ﬁrst and then more slowly, ﬁnishing at 53%. The
joint probability of higher output and lower prices is close to zero in the EA
throughout.
22Table 3: Probability Estimates that Output is Higher and Prices are
Lower, separately and jointly in UK and EA under Entry at par at
Beginning of 1999Q1
Output Prices Output & Prices
Year UK EA UK EU UK EU
1999Q1 0.03 0.00 0.99 0.47 0.03 0.00
Q2 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.22 0.00 0.00
Q3 0.02 0.01 0.95 0.10 0.01 0.00
Q4 0.06 0.03 0.94 0.08 0.04 0.00
2000Q1 0.11 0.07 0.93 0.07 0.08 0.00
Q2 0.15 0.11 0.90 0.07 0.12 0.00
Q3 0.24 0.16 0.87 0.08 0.20 0.00
Q4 0.37 0.21 0.85 0.09 0.32 0.00
2001Q1 0.49 0.26 0.83 0.10 0.43 0.01
Q2 0.56 0.30 0.80 0.10 0.49 0.01
Q3 0.60 0.34 0.78 0.11 0.53 0.01
Q4 0.62 0.37 0.76 0.12 0.54 0.01
2002Q1 0.62 0.39 0.74 0.13 0.55 0.01
Q2 0.62 0.41 0.73 0.14 0.55 0.01
Q3 0.62 0.43 0.71 0.15 0.55 0.01
Q4 0.61 0.44 0.70 0.15 0.55 0.01
2003Q1 0.60 0.44 0.69 0.16 0.54 0.02
Q2 0.60 0.45 0.68 0.16 0.54 0.02
Q3 0.59 0.45 0.67 0.17 0.54 0.02
Q4 0.58 0.46 0.66 0.17 0.53 0.02
Figure 4: Probability Estimates that UK and EA Output is Higher
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23Figure 5: Probability Estimates that UK and EA Prices are Lower
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In terms of output the UK initially would have lost from the entry, but
gained in the medium term with higher output levels and lower prices. The EA
would have experienced lower output and higher prices throughout the period.
Thus UK entry seems likely to have generated welfare losses for the EA. For the
UK the welfare eﬀects are ambiguous depending on the relative weights given
to output and inﬂation and the discount rate.
To check the robustness of this conclusion we considered a more general
base line model where the forecasts are obtained conditional on the observed
values of the oil price, US interest rates and US equity prices over the period
1999Q1-2003Q4. Since entry imposes restrictions on the model, the eﬀect of
these variables can be diﬀerent in the restricted and unrestricted cases. This will
be reﬂected in the measure of the eﬀect of entry. Table 4 gives the probabilities
that interest rates are lower as a result of entry. In the base-line case, the
probability of UK interest rates being lower declines smoothly. With the global
shocks included, the pattern is quite similar, but with some extra volatility. The
probability that the EA interest rate is lower conditional on observed variables
is similar for the ﬁrst two years, rising from zero to a maximum of 98% then
falling, but more slowly in the conditional case than the unconditional case
being 67% in 2003Q4.
24Table 4: Conditional Probability Estimates that UK and EA
























Note: The probability estimates are obtained conditional on the realised values of oil
prices, US equity prices and US short and long-term interest rates over the period 1999Q1-
2003Q4.
Table 5 shows the probabilities that GDP is higher or prices lower in the two
areas as a result of UK entry at par, conditional on the observed values of oil
prices, US equity prices and interest rates over the period 1999Q1-2003Q4. Fig-
ure 6 plots the unconditional and conditional probabilities that GDP is higher for
the EA and UK. Conditioning on the observed values introduces some volatility
and the UK conditional probabilities are rather higher than the unconditional
probabilities. The EA conditional probabilities are somewhat lower, but the
time proﬁle of the eﬀects are rather similar. These results suggest that we do
not need to be able to forecast these four variables in order to measure the
overall eﬀects of the UK joining the euro.
25Table 5: Conditional Probability Estimates that Output is Higher
and Prices are Lower, separately in UK and EA under Entry at par
at Beginning of 1999Q1
Output Prices
Year UK EA UK EA
1999Q1 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.81
Q2 0.01 0.01 1.00 0.59
Q3 0.05 0.02 0.98 0.34
Q4 0.13 0.05 0.96 0.28
2000Q1 0.28 0.10 0.94 0.25
Q2 0.28 0.13 0.91 0.23
Q3 0.37 0.15 0.89 0.21
Q4 0.46 0.18 0.86 0.20
2001Q1 0.54 0.22 0.83 0.20
Q2 0.64 0.25 0.80 0.20
Q3 0.65 0.30 0.78 0.21
Q4 0.66 0.34 0.76 0.23
2002Q1 0.69 0.37 0.74 0.23
Q2 0.70 0.40 0.72 0.24
Q3 0.68 0.41 0.71 0.25
Q4 0.69 0.42 0.68 0.25
2003Q1 0.69 0.44 0.67 0.26
Q2 0.66 0.46 0.66 0.27
Q3 0.66 0.47 0.65 0.28
Q4 0.64 0.48 0.64 0.29
Note: The probability estimates are obtained conditional on the realised values of oil
prices, US equity prices and US short and long-term interest rates over the period 1999Q1-
2003Q4.
26Figure 6: Conditional and Unconditional Probability Estimates that
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Note: The probability estimates are obtained conditional on the realised values of oil prices,
US equity prices and US short and long-term interest rates over the period 1999Q1-2003Q4.
Table 6 shows the results for entry in 2004. Figure 7 plots the probability
that GDP is higher for the EA and UK for 1999 entry and 2004 entry, superim-
posed. For GDP the time patterns are very similar, with the diﬀerences being
larger at the beginning of the period, when the probability of both EA and UK
output being higher is larger with 2004 entry than with 1999 entry, but the
diﬀerences are very small by the end. For prices, the patterns over time are
again similar, with the probability that prices are lower being rather smaller
for the UK and, except for the ﬁrst two periods, rather higher for the EA. The
qualitative conclusions are thus almost identical whether one starts from 1999
or 2004. This may be partly because sterling and euro rates against the dollar
were similar in 1998Q4 and 2003Q4 and the UK euro interest diﬀerential was
quite similar, but other initial conditions were very diﬀerent at the two entry
dates. Thus our conclusions seem to be robust to initial conditions.
Conditioning on the realisations of observed variables and diﬀerent initial
conditions has quite small eﬀects on the quantitative results and does not change
the qualitative conclusions.
27Table 6: Probability Estimates that Output is Higher and Prices are
Lower, separately in UK and EA under Entry at par at Beginning of
2004Q1
Output Prices
Year UK EA UK EA
2004Q1 0.11 0.05 0.84 0.25
Q2 0.05 0.05 0.79 0.15
Q3 0.10 0.09 0.74 0.11
Q4 0.15 0.15 0.74 0.10
2005Q1 0.20 0.21 0.73 0.10
Q2 0.25 0.26 0.71 0.11
Q3 0.33 0.29 0.69 0.12
Q4 0.42 0.33 0.68 0.13
2006Q1 0.50 0.36 0.67 0.14
Q2 0.55 0.38 0.66 0.16
Q3 0.58 0.40 0.64 0.17
Q4 0.60 0.42 0.63 0.18
2007Q1 0.60 0.44 0.63 0.19
Q2 0.60 0.45 0.62 0.20
Q3 0.60 0.46 0.61 0.21
Q4 0.60 0.47 0.60 0.21
2008Q1 0.59 0.47 0.60 0.22
Q2 0.59 0.48 0.59 0.23
Q3 0.58 0.48 0.59 0.23
Q4 0.57 0.49 0.58 0.24
28Figure 7: Probability Estimates that UK and EA Output is Higher
under Entry at par at Beginning of 1999Q1 and at Beginning of
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5.4 UK Entry with Appreciation or Depreciation
In much of the discussion of euro entry a central issue has been what would be
the right rate at which to join. To examine this issue we return to the baseline
case, entry in 1999Q1 without conditioning on the four US variables. However,
rather than assuming that entry was at par, the exchange rate prevailing in
1998Q4, we assume that the UK was able to appreciate or depreciate on entry
and lock itself into the euro at a higher or lower rate. One might question
whether the other members would have allowed such a move, but analysis of
the eﬀects allows us to judge the signiﬁcance of the joining rate. We consider four
cases: an appreciation of 10%, parity, depreciation of 10% and a depreciation
of 30%.
Table 7 shows the probability that interest rates are lower as a result of
entry in the UK and EA for the four cases. In the UK the probability of lower
interest rates starts out at one and declines roughly linearly in all four cases.
The speed of decline is fastest in the case of 10% appreciation, slowest in the
case of 30% depreciation, with probabilities of lower interest rates between 70%
(10% appreciation) and 88% (30% depreciation). In the EA the probability of
lower interest rates as a result of entry starts at zero in all four cases. In the
10% appreciation and parity cases, these probabilities rise to a maximum of 73%
29and 94%, respectively, in 2000Q1, then decline to 28% and 44% by 2003Q4. In
the two depreciation cases, the probability of lower interest rates starts at zero
reaching a maximum of 99% (10% depreciation) 100% (30% depreciation) in
2001Q1 then decline to 59% and 81% by the end of 2003. Thus for both the EA
and UK entry with depreciation makes lower interest rates more likely.
Table 7: Probability Estimates that UK and EA Short-Term
Interest Rates are Lower under Entry at par at Beginning of
1999Q1 for Alternative Exchange Rates
UK EA
Appreciation At par Depreciation Appreciation At par Depreciation
Year 10% 0% 10% 30% 10% 0% 10% 30%
1999Q1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00
Q2 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.04 0.12 0.25 0.59
Q3 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.17 0.39 0.63 0.92
Q4 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.54 0.76 0.90 0.99
2000Q1 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.73 0.94 0.99 1.00
Q2 0.92 0.95 0.96 0.98 0.68 0.94 0.99 1.00
Q3 0.90 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.60 0.89 0.98 1.00
Q4 0.88 0.91 0.94 0.97 0.53 0.83 0.96 1.00
2001Q1 0.85 0.89 0.92 0.96 0.46 0.76 0.93 1.00
Q2 0.82 0.87 0.91 0.95 0.40 0.69 0.88 0.99
Q3 0.80 0.86 0.90 0.94 0.36 0.63 0.83 0.98
Q4 0.78 0.84 0.88 0.94 0.33 0.58 0.79 0.96
2002Q1 0.76 0.82 0.87 0.93 0.31 0.55 0.74 0.95
Q2 0.75 0.81 0.86 0.92 0.30 0.51 0.71 0.93
Q3 0.73 0.80 0.85 0.91 0.29 0.49 0.68 0.90
Q4 0.72 0.79 0.84 0.90 0.28 0.47 0.65 0.88
2003Q1 0.72 0.78 0.83 0.90 0.28 0.46 0.63 0.86
Q2 0.71 0.77 0.82 0.89 0.28 0.45 0.61 0.85
Q3 0.70 0.77 0.81 0.88 0.28 0.44 0.60 0.83
Q4 0.70 0.76 0.81 0.88 0.28 0.44 0.59 0.81
30Table 8 shows the probability that GDP would be higher under the diﬀerent
entry rates. Figure 8 plots the four cases for UK GDP. One might expect that
UK entry with appreciation would reduce the probability that entry increases
UK GDP and depreciation increase it. One gets the expected ordering before
200Q1 and after 2002Q2, but in between the ordering is reversed. Figure 9 plots
the probability EA GDP would be higher for the four cases. The EA probabili-
ties show a single crossing point in late 1999, and after that the probabilities are
in the expected order with UK appreciation making higher EA GDP most likely
and UK 30% depreciation making it least likely. With a 10% UK appreciation
the probability that EA GDP is higher is over 50% from 2002 onwards.
Table 8: Probability Estimates that UK and EA Output is Higher
under Entry at par at Beginning of 1999Q1 for Alternative
Exchange Rates
UK EA
Appreciation At par Depreciation Appreciation At par Depreciation
Year 10% 0% 10% 30% 10% 0% 10% 30%
1999Q1 0.00 0.03 0.32 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.27
Q2 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07
Q3 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Q4 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.00
2000Q1 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.01
Q2 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.18 0.11 0.06 0.02
Q3 0.29 0.24 0.21 0.15 0.25 0.16 0.09 0.03
Q4 0.43 0.37 0.33 0.25 0.32 0.21 0.13 0.05
2001Q1 0.54 0.49 0.44 0.37 0.38 0.26 0.17 0.07
Q2 0.59 0.56 0.52 0.46 0.42 0.30 0.21 0.09
Q3 0.62 0.60 0.57 0.53 0.46 0.34 0.24 0.12
Q4 0.63 0.62 0.60 0.58 0.49 0.37 0.27 0.14
2002Q1 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.51 0.39 0.30 0.16
Q2 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.52 0.41 0.32 0.18
Q3 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.53 0.43 0.33 0.20
Q4 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.54 0.44 0.35 0.21
2003Q1 0.59 0.60 0.62 0.63 0.54 0.44 0.36 0.22
Q2 0.58 0.60 0.61 0.63 0.55 0.45 0.37 0.23
Q3 0.57 0.59 0.61 0.63 0.55 0.45 0.37 0.24
Q4 0.57 0.58 0.60 0.63 0.55 0.46 0.37 0.25
31Figure 8: Probability Estimates that UK Output is Higher under
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Figure 9: Probability Estimates that EA Output is Higher under
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32Table 9 shows the probability that prices are lower. For the UK the proba-
bilities that prices will be lower start large and decline, but are always greater
than 50%. The ordering is the reverse of what one might expect. UK prices
are most likely to be lower with entry with a 30% depreciation and least likely
with a 10% appreciation. For the EA the probability of prices being lower ﬁrst
declines and then rises, except for the 30% depreciation where the probability
falls continually. The EA shows the same ordering as the UK, prices are most
likely to be lower with an initial depreciation and least likely to be lower with
an initial appreciation.
Table 9: Probability Estimates that UK and EA Prices are Lower
under Entry at par at Beginning of 1999Q1 for Alternative
Exchange Rates
UK EA
Appreciation At par Depreciation Appreciation At par Depreciation
Year 10% 0% 10% 30% 10% 0% 10% 30%
1999Q1 0.82 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.02 0.47 0.96 1.00
Q2 0.89 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.01 0.22 0.73 1.00
Q3 0.85 0.95 0.99 1.00 0.01 0.10 0.42 0.96
Q4 0.86 0.94 0.98 1.00 0.01 0.08 0.36 0.92
2000Q1 0.83 0.93 0.97 1.00 0.01 0.07 0.31 0.88
Q2 0.78 0.90 0.96 0.99 0.01 0.07 0.27 0.82
Q3 0.75 0.87 0.94 0.99 0.01 0.08 0.27 0.79
Q4 0.72 0.85 0.93 0.98 0.01 0.09 0.27 0.76
2001Q1 0.70 0.83 0.91 0.98 0.02 0.10 0.27 0.74
Q2 0.67 0.80 0.89 0.97 0.02 0.10 0.28 0.72
Q3 0.64 0.78 0.87 0.96 0.03 0.11 0.28 0.70
Q4 0.63 0.76 0.86 0.95 0.04 0.12 0.28 0.68
2002Q1 0.61 0.74 0.84 0.94 0.04 0.13 0.29 0.66
Q2 0.59 0.73 0.82 0.93 0.05 0.14 0.29 0.65
Q3 0.58 0.71 0.81 0.92 0.05 0.15 0.29 0.63
Q4 0.57 0.70 0.80 0.91 0.06 0.15 0.29 0.62
2003Q1 0.56 0.69 0.79 0.91 0.06 0.16 0.29 0.61
Q2 0.56 0.68 0.77 0.90 0.07 0.16 0.30 0.60
Q3 0.55 0.67 0.76 0.89 0.07 0.17 0.30 0.59
Q4 0.55 0.66 0.76 0.88 0.08 0.17 0.30 0.58
5.5 Point Estimates of the Eﬀects of UK Entry
We have emphasised probabilities because we think they provide a more useful
way of conveying results that can be quite uncertain. However, to give some
indication of the orders of magnitude of the eﬀects, Table 10 shows the eﬀect
33of entry (the point estimate with entry less the associated point estimate with-
out entry) for UK and EA interest rates (percent annualised), the sterling-euro
exchange rate and the UK and EA eﬀective rates, expressed as percentage dif-
ferences between the case with entry and without entry. These eﬀects are for
the case of entry at par in 1999 conditioning on oil prices, US interest rates and
US equity prices. Entry makes UK short rates over 2% lower initially though
the size of the reduction varies over time. Entry initially raises EA rates and
then lowers them by around half a percentage point. Entry causes sterling to be
generally stronger relative to the euro than it would have been without entry.
UK entry causes the UK eﬀe c t i v er a t et oa p p r e c i a t er e l a t i v et ow h a ti tw o u l d
have been without entry and the EA eﬀective rate to depreciate. Towards the
end of the period the EA eﬀective exchange rate depreciates by about 15% as a
result of the UK entry.
Table 10: Conditional Point Estimates of the Eﬀects of UK Entry
on UK and EA Short-Term Interest Rate, the £/Euro Rate and
Eﬀective Exchange Rate under Entry at par at Beginning of 1999Q1
Short-Term Exchange Rate (%)
Year Interest Rate (%) Spot Rate Eﬀective Rate
UK EA £/Euro UK EA
1999Q1 -2.35 0.26 -0.21 0.13 0.72
Q2 -2.49 0.06 -0.97 0.54 2.90
Q3 -2.55 -0.20 -0.26 1.67 3.80
Q4 -2.36 -0.35 1.41 3.04 3.50
2000Q1 -2.33 -0.55 1.57 3.34 3.82
Q2 -2.45 -0.65 -1.62 1.37 5.76
Q3 -2.35 -0.67 -4.37 -0.16 7.78
Q4 -2.49 -0.68 -8.69 -2.94 10.25
2001Q1 -2.33 -0.73 -11.74 -4.87 12.07
Q2 -2.07 -0.77 -13.21 -5.76 13.03
Q3 -2.20 -0.73 -15.60 -7.51 14.03
Q4 -2.04 -0.70 -15.43 -7.43 13.90
2002Q1 -1.75 -0.64 -13.95 -6.35 13.31
Q2 -1.83 -0.53 -15.51 -7.41 14.11
Q3 -1.60 -0.51 -18.06 -9.13 15.40
Q4 -1.32 -0.52 -18.62 -9.49 15.76
2003Q1 -1.22 -0.51 -20.44 -10.96 16.27
Q2 -1.45 -0.49 -21.16 -11.71 16.18
Q3 -1.10 -0.47 -18.31 -9.78 14.77
Q4 -1.61 -0.35 -18.61 -10.12 14.70
Note: The point estimates are obtained conditional on the realised values of oil prices,
US equity prices and US short and long-term interest rates over the period 1999Q1-2003Q4.
The ﬁgures for the interest rate are percent per annum.
34Table 11 shows the eﬀect on UK and EA output and prices as percentage
changes between the with entry and without entry cases. The eﬀects are quite
small. The maximum reduction in UK output per quarter as a result of entry
is -0.54% in 1999Q2, the maximum increase is less than 1%. The reductions in
EA GDP as a result of entry are less than 1%. Entry causes UK prices to be
3% lower and EA prices 3% higher after 5 years; the eﬀects on annual inﬂation
rates would be barely noticeable.
Table 11: Conditional Point Estimates of the Eﬀects of UK Entry
on UK and EA Output and Prices under Entry at par at Beginning
of 1999Q1
Output (%) Prices (%)
Year UK EA UK EA
1999Q1 -0.25 -0.26 -0.54 -0.09
Q2 -0.54 -0.55 -1.71 -0.05
Q3 -0.48 -0.81 -1.91 0.15
Q4 -0.35 -0.84 -2.23 0.30
2000Q1 -0.19 -0.79 -2.67 0.45
Q2 -0.19 -0.80 -2.87 0.63
Q3 -0.11 -0.83 -3.08 0.84
Q4 -0.04 -0.78 -3.20 1.04
2001Q1 0.05 -0.73 -3.34 1.26
Q2 0.22 -0.67 -3.39 1.50
Q3 0.30 -0.55 -3.40 1.66
Q4 0.36 -0.45 -3.56 1.79
2002Q1 0.52 -0.37 -3.64 1.96
Q2 0.63 -0.30 -3.65 2.11
Q3 0.64 -0.27 -3.67 2.29
Q4 0.78 -0.25 -3.53 2.50
2003Q1 0.83 -0.18 -3.49 2.66
Q2 0.78 -0.12 -3.43 2.78
Q3 0.83 -0.11 -3.64 2.91
Q4 0.80 -0.08 -3.58 3.01
Note: The point estimates are obtained conditional on the realised values of oil prices, US
equity prices and US short and long-term interest rates over the period 1999Q1-2003Q4.
6S w e d i s h E n t r y
For comparison we conducted exactly the same set of exercises for Sweden.
The tables and ﬁgures, which match those for the UK are available on request.
Starting with the baseline case of entry at par in 1999, Sweden like the UK
would probably have had lower interest rates, though the probabilities are a
little higher in Sweden. However, the EA trajectory for the probability of lower
interest rate is very diﬀe r e n ti nt h et w oc a s e s . W i t hU Ke n t r yi ts t a r t e da t
35zero and rose to 94% after a year, then fell back to 44%. With Swedish entry
it starts at 85%, falls to 34% then rises to 48%. The probability that output
is higher in Sweden with entry starts at 65%, rises to 84% and then declines
to 69%. The probability that prices are lower starts at 27%, rises to 48%,
then drops to 32% before ﬁnishing at 35%. Thus Sweden is likely to have had
higher output and prices with entry. For the EA, Swedish entry gives an initial
probability of higher output of 69%, which rises to 80% and falls back to 53%.
The EA probability that prices are lower is between 10% and 20% throughout
the sample. Whereas UK entry would probably lower EA GDP, Swedish entry
would raise it. Conditioning on observed values of oil prices, US interest rates
and US equity prices adds a lot of volatility to the Swedish output probability
estimates, but raises the probability of the eﬀe c to fe n t r yh a v i n gap o s i t i v e
eﬀect on output towards the end of the sample. In the case of the UK starting
in 2004Q1 made very little diﬀerence, in the case of Sweden it does make a
diﬀerence. The probability that output is higher with Swedish entry in 2004
starts at 46% rising to 61% at the end of the sample, a little below the 69% at
the end of the 1999 entry sample. For the EA it starts at 30% and rises to 53%,
the same value as at the end of the 1999 sample. Once the eﬀect of the initial
conditions has worn oﬀ, the probabilities of the two become very similar. In
terms of the eﬀect on output, 1999 would have been a better time for Sweden
to enter than 2004, both from the Swedish and EA points of view. However, in
terms of prices, the probability that Swedish entry would lower prices is higher
for both Sweden and the EA for 2004 entry than for 1999 entry. So later entry
would tend to lower both output and prices relative to earlier entry.
We now consider the four entry exchange rate cases. The eﬀects on interest
r a t e si sv e r yd i ﬀerent from the UK. In the UK the probability of lower interest
rates starts out at one and declines roughly linearly in all four cases, with ﬁnal
probabilities of lower interest rates between 70% (10% appreciation) and 88%
(30% depreciation). In Sweden initially, like the UK, the 30% depreciation case
has the highest probability of lower interest rates (71%) and 10% appreciation
the lowest (66%), but the probabilities cross in 1999Q3 and the order is re-
versed with ﬁnal probabilities between 68% (10% appreciation) and 62% (30%
depreciation). At the beginning entry with a 30% depreciation gives the high-
est probability of lower interest rates (100%) and 10% appreciation the lowest
(45%). At the end of the sample appreciation gives the highest probability of
lower interest rates (52%) and 30% depreciation the lowest (37%). For the UK,
entry with depreciation made lower EA interest rates more likely, for Sweden
entry with appreciation makes lower EA interest rates more likely. For GDP
appreciation reduces the probability that entry will increase Swedish output and
depreciation increases the probability. At the beginning the diﬀerences are very
large with a probability of higher Swedish output 15% with a 10% appreciation
and 100% for a 30% depreciation, but by the end of the sample the diﬀerences
are smaller, ranging from 65% to 79%, respectively. Exactly the same pattern
holds for the EA. Swedish entry with depreciation increases the probability EA
output will be higher. This is the reverse of the pattern for the UK, where
appreciation increases the probability that EA output will be higher. Except
36for the ﬁrst period, when the order is reversed, entry with appreciation has the
highest probability of giving lower prices (51% at the end of the period) and
30% depreciation the lowest (8% at the end of the period). This is the order one
would expect, rather than the reverse order found in the UK. The same order
holds for the EA: entry with appreciation has the highest probability of lower
prices, entry with depreciation the lowest. However, even with appreciation the
highest probability of lower prices is only 27%.
Looking at the size of the eﬀects rather than the probabilities, the eﬀect of
entry on Swedish interest rates is much larger than the eﬀect on UK interest
rates, the maximum reduction, in 2003Q2, is 7.38 percentage points. The eﬀect
on EA interest rates is much smaller for Swedish entry than for UK entry.
Whereas entry causes appreciation relative to no entry for the UK, for Sweden
entry causes depreciation relative to no entry. Swedish entry, like UK entry
causes the EA eﬀective rate to depreciate in the medium term. The size of
the output eﬀe c t so fe n t r ya r em u c hl a r g e ri nS w e d e nt h a nt h eU K ,r e a c h i n ga
maximum of 3.76% higher in 2003Q3. The eﬀects on EA output are small as
are the eﬀects on Swedish prices. The eﬀect of Swedish entry on EA prices is
rather larger than the eﬀect of UK entry, EA prices are about 8% higher at the
end of the sample, compared to only 3% in the case of the UK.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has a methodological and a substantive objective. The methodolog-
ical objective is to provide a consistent approach to estimating the probability
distribution for the eﬀects of a regime change which can take account of interna-
tional interdependence and observed global shocks. The substantive objective
is to estimate the probability that output would be higher and prices lower in
the UK and the EA if the UK had joined the euro.
UK entry to the euro in 1999Q1 at 1998Q4 exchange rates would probably
h a v er e d u c e dU KG D Pi nt h es h o r tt e r ma n dr a i s e di ti nt h el o n g e rt e r m ,
but the eﬀects are small. UK entry would have probably caused EA GDP
to be lower. Entry would have probably caused UK prices to be lower and
EA prices to be higher. UK entry would have been bad for the EA, because
of lower output and higher prices, though the eﬀects are small. For the UK
the welfare eﬀect is ambiguous, depending on the discount rate used, and on
the relative weights given to output and inﬂation. This conclusion seems quite
robust to alternative scenarios, including conditioning on observed global shocks
over the period 1999Q1 to 2003Q4 and entering with diﬀerent initial conditions
in 2004Q1.
Much of the discussion has emphasised the importance of the exchange rate
at which the UK joined the euro and our experiments conﬁrm the importance
of this. The probabilities change when one allows for a permanent appreciation
or depreciation of the sterling-euro rate on entry. With a large depreciation on
entry, the probability of entry having a positive eﬀect on UK output becomes
greater.
37We also made a comparison with Sweden, where entry to the euro in 1999
would probably have increased output and raised prices, so again no unambigu-
ous welfare conclusion is possible. However, the Swedish results diﬀered in a
number of important respects from the UK results. This is not surprising as
they are rather diﬀerent economies.
There are a number of other issues that might merit investigation. These
include the eﬀect of parameter and model uncertainty. Our conclusion about
the eﬀect of UK entry can only be tentative until the robustness of the result
to parameter and model uncertainty has been analysed, using techniques such
as those applied in Garratt et al. (2003) in the context of a macroeconometric
model of the UK. There are also other channels such as national debt and budget
deﬁcits that could be important for the analysis of the UK entry. The GVAR
model used in this paper assumes that the ﬁscal implications of the UK entry
will, to a large extent, be picked up by the term premium and their diﬀerences
across the UK and the EA. But a more explicit analysis of the ﬁscal eﬀects of
the UK entry within the GVAR framework would be of interest.
38APPENDIX
Transforming the GVAR: Prices and Nominal
Exchange Rates
Assume that inﬂation, pit − pi,t−1,i st h eﬁrst variable in ˚ xit, in all country
models and, with the exception of the US, the second and third entries in ˚ xit
are the real exchange rate, eit − pit, and the short term interest rate, rS
it.T h e
rest of the variables in˚ xit will be denoted by the (ki − 3)×1 vector xrest
it for the
non-US models, and by the (k0 − 2) × 1 vector xrest























 for i =1 ,2,...,N.
The GVAR model in these variables as set above
˚ xt = a0 + a1t + G1˚ xt−1 + G2˚ xt−2 +˚ vt, (A.1)
where ˚ xt =( ˚ x0
0t,˚ x0
1t,...,˚ x0
Nt)0,a n da0, a1, G1, G2 are deﬁned in terms of the
country-speciﬁcm o d e l sa si nS e c t i o n3 .
Since our aim is to ﬁx UK’s nominal exchange rate and short term interest
rate to the ones in the euro area, we need to work with a GVAR in the levels
of these variables. Assume that ˚ x1t and ˚ x2t refer to the endogenous variables
of the models for the euro area and the UK, respectively, and denote the ki ×1






















 for i =1 ,2,...,N.
The relationships between xit and˚ xit are given by the following dynamic iden-
tities
xit = Bi˚ xit + Cixi,t−1, for i =0 ,1,..N,
where
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It is clear that B is non-singular and its inverse is given by
B−1=

    




























, for i =1 ,2,...,N,
and
˚ xt = B−1 (xt − Cxt−1).
Using this result in (A.1) we have
B−1 (xt − Cxt−1)=a0+a1t+G1B−1 (xt−1 − Cxt−2)+G2B−1 (xt−2 − Cxt−3)+ ˚ vt,
or




(BG1B−1C − BG2B−1) xt−2 − BG2B−1Cxt−3 + vt,
where
vt = B˚ vt.
Note that (A.3) can be written as
xt = b0 + b1t + F1xt−1 + F2xt−2+F3xt−3+vt,
40where





, F2 = B(G2B−1 − G1B−1C), F3 = −BG2B−1C.
Suppose that the characteristic equation of the model in inﬂation and real
exchange rates, deﬁned by (A.1), lie on or inside the unit circle. Let λ be the
characteristic root of the model in price levels and nominal exchange rates as




λ +( BG1B−1C − BG2B−1)λ
2 + BG2B−1Cλ





















¢¯ ¯ =0 .
Hence, the characteristic roots of (A.4) are given by the solutions to
¯ ¯¡
Ik−G1λ − G2λ
2¢¯ ¯ =0 , (A.5)
which is the characteristic equation of (A.1), and
¯ ¯¡
Ik − B−1CBλ
¢¯ ¯ =0 . (A.6)
However, it is easily seen that
B−1CB =

    






















































The eigenvalues of B−1CBare given by those of C0 and B
−1
i CiBi for i =1 ,2,...,N,
which are zero or unity. Therefore, the characteristic roots of (A.3) are the same
as the characteristics of (A.1) plus the roots of (A.6) which are either zero or
unity.
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Supplementary Tables for the Sweden Euro Entry Experiments
1Table S1: Probability Estimates that SE and EA Short-Term Interest Rates are Lower























Table S2: Probability Estimates that Output is Higher and Prices are Lower, separately
and jointly in SE and EA under Entry at par at Beginning of 1999Q1
Output Prices Output & Prices
Year SE EA SE EU SE EU
1999Q1 0.65 0.69 0.27 0.18 0.08 0.08
Q2 0.76 0.75 0.33 0.15 0.11 0.04
Q3 0.80 0.79 0.48 0.14 0.31 0.04
Q4 0.83 0.80 0.44 0.13 0.32 0.03
2000Q1 0.84 0.79 0.44 0.12 0.34 0.02
Q2 0.83 0.78 0.41 0.12 0.33 0.02
Q3 0.81 0.76 0.39 0.13 0.31 0.02
Q4 0.79 0.74 0.37 0.13 0.29 0.01
2001Q1 0.78 0.71 0.34 0.13 0.27 0.01
Q2 0.76 0.69 0.33 0.14 0.26 0.01
Q3 0.75 0.66 0.32 0.14 0.26 0.01
Q4 0.73 0.64 0.32 0.15 0.26 0.01
2002Q1 0.73 0.62 0.32 0.15 0.26 0.01
Q2 0.72 0.60 0.32 0.16 0.26 0.01
Q3 0.71 0.59 0.32 0.17 0.27 0.01
Q4 0.71 0.57 0.33 0.17 0.27 0.01
2003Q1 0.70 0.56 0.33 0.18 0.28 0.01
Q2 0.70 0.55 0.34 0.19 0.29 0.01
Q3 0.70 0.54 0.35 0.19 0.29 0.01
Q4 0.69 0.53 0.35 0.20 0.30 0.01Table S3: Conditional Probability Estimates that SE and EA Short-Term Interest Rates























Note: The probability estimates are obtained conditional on the realised values of oil prices, US equity prices and US
short and long-term interest rates over the period 1999Q1-2003Q4.
Table S4: Conditional Probability Estimates that Output is Higher and Prices are Lower,
separately in SE and EA under Entry at par at Beginning of 1999Q1
Output Prices
Year SE EA SE EA
1 9 9 9 Q 10 . 5 90 . 7 5 0 . 3 00 . 2 6
Q2 0.61 0.72 0.39 0.28
Q3 0.62 0.67 0.43 0.26
Q4 0.65 0.62 0.39 0.24
2 0 0 0 Q 10 . 6 50 . 6 0 0 . 5 10 . 2 4
Q2 0.65 0.56 0.46 0.22
Q3 0.71 0.52 0.49 0.22
Q4 0.74 0.48 0.49 0.20
2 0 0 1 Q 10 . 8 30 . 4 6 0 . 4 30 . 1 8
Q2 0.85 0.47 0.50 0.16
Q3 0.85 0.48 0.56 0.15
Q4 0.85 0.49 0.59 0.15
2 0 0 2 Q 10 . 8 30 . 5 1 0 . 6 60 . 1 4
Q2 0.84 0.51 0.67 0.14
Q3 0.89 0.48 0.64 0.13
Q4 0.93 0.50 0.67 0.12
2 0 0 3 Q 10 . 9 40 . 5 4 0 . 7 30 . 1 1
Q2 0.94 0.56 0.75 0.11
Q3 0.94 0.60 0.80 0.10
Q4 0.92 0.62 0.81 0.10
Note: The probability estimates are obtained conditional on the realised values of oil prices, US equity prices and US
short and long-term interest rates over the period 1999Q1-2003Q4.Table S5: Probability Estimates that Output is Higher and Prices are Lower, separately
in SE and EA under Entry at par at Beginning of 2004Q1
Output Prices
Year SE EA SE EA
2 0 0 4 Q 10 . 4 60 . 3 0 0 . 4 30 . 4 9
Q2 0.49 0.33 0.49 0.46
Q3 0.47 0.39 0.68 0.46
Q4 0.52 0.43 0.67 0.44
2 0 0 5 Q 10 . 5 50 . 4 6 0 . 7 00 . 4 4
Q2 0.56 0.48 0.70 0.44
Q3 0.58 0.50 0.70 0.44
Q4 0.59 0.51 0.69 0.44
2 0 0 6 Q 10 . 6 00 . 5 2 0 . 6 80 . 4 4
Q2 0.60 0.53 0.67 0.44
Q3 0.60 0.53 0.66 0.44
Q4 0.60 0.53 0.65 0.44
2 0 0 7 Q 10 . 6 10 . 5 3 0 . 6 40 . 4 3
Q2 0.61 0.53 0.63 0.43
Q3 0.61 0.53 0.62 0.43
Q4 0.61 0.53 0.61 0.43
2 0 0 8 Q 10 . 6 10 . 5 3 0 . 6 10 . 4 3
Q2 0.61 0.53 0.60 0.43
Q3 0.61 0.53 0.60 0.43
Q4 0.61 0.53 0.59 0.43
Table S6: Probability Estimates that SE and EA Short-Term Interest Rates are Lower
under Entry at par at Beginning of 1999Q1 for Alternative Exchange Rates
SE EA
Appreciation At par Depreciation Appreciation At par Depreciation
Year 10% 0% 10% 30% 10% 0% 10% 30%
1999Q1 0.66 0.67 0.69 0.71 0.45 0.85 0.98 1.00
Q2 0.67 0.69 0.71 0.74 0.58 0.89 0.98 1.00
Q3 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.91
Q4 0.76 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.84 0.72 0.57 0.30
2000Q1 0.77 0.76 0.74 0.71 0.69 0.50 0.32 0.11
Q2 0.77 0.75 0.73 0.69 0.57 0.40 0.25 0.09
Q3 0.73 0.71 0.68 0.64 0.51 0.35 0.23 0.08
Q4 0.72 0.69 0.66 0.62 0.47 0.34 0.23 0.10
2001Q1 0.71 0.69 0.66 0.62 0.45 0.34 0.25 0.13
Q2 0.71 0.68 0.65 0.61 0.45 0.35 0.27 0.16
Q3 0.69 0.67 0.64 0.60 0.45 0.37 0.29 0.18
Q4 0.69 0.66 0.64 0.60 0.46 0.38 0.32 0.21
2002Q1 0.69 0.66 0.64 0.60 0.47 0.40 0.34 0.24
Q2 0.69 0.66 0.64 0.60 0.48 0.41 0.36 0.26
Q3 0.68 0.66 0.64 0.61 0.49 0.43 0.37 0.29
Q4 0.68 0.66 0.64 0.61 0.49 0.44 0.39 0.31
2003Q1 0.68 0.66 0.64 0.61 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.32
Q2 0.68 0.66 0.65 0.62 0.51 0.46 0.42 0.34
Q3 0.68 0.66 0.65 0.62 0.51 0.47 0.43 0.36
Q4 0.68 0.67 0.65 0.62 0.52 0.48 0.44 0.37Table S7: Probability Estimates that SE and EA Output is Higher under Entry at par
at Beginning of 1999Q1 for Alternative Exchange Rates
SE EA
Appreciation At par Depreciation Appreciation At par Depreciation
Year 10% 0% 10% 30% 10% 0% 10% 30%
1999Q1 0.15 0.65 0.95 1.00 0.01 0.69 1.00 1.00
Q2 0.58 0.76 0.88 0.97 0.16 0.75 0.99 1.00
Q3 0.63 0.80 0.90 0.98 0.42 0.79 0.96 1.00
Q4 0.71 0.83 0.91 0.98 0.52 0.80 0.94 1.00
2000Q1 0.74 0.84 0.90 0.97 0.57 0.79 0.92 0.99
Q2 0.74 0.83 0.89 0.96 0.60 0.78 0.89 0.98
Q3 0.73 0.81 0.87 0.94 0.61 0.76 0.86 0.96
Q4 0.71 0.79 0.84 0.92 0.61 0.74 0.83 0.94
2001Q1 0.71 0.78 0.83 0.90 0.60 0.71 0.80 0.91
Q2 0.70 0.76 0.81 0.88 0.58 0.69 0.77 0.88
Q3 0.69 0.75 0.80 0.87 0.57 0.66 0.74 0.84
Q4 0.68 0.73 0.78 0.85 0.56 0.64 0.71 0.81
2002Q1 0.67 0.73 0.77 0.84 0.55 0.62 0.68 0.78
Q2 0.66 0.72 0.76 0.83 0.54 0.60 0.66 0.75
Q3 0.66 0.71 0.75 0.82 0.53 0.59 0.64 0.72
Q4 0.66 0.71 0.75 0.81 0.52 0.57 0.62 0.70
2003Q1 0.65 0.70 0.74 0.80 0.51 0.56 0.60 0.68
Q2 0.65 0.70 0.74 0.80 0.50 0.55 0.59 0.66
Q3 0.65 0.70 0.73 0.79 0.50 0.54 0.58 0.64
Q4 0.65 0.69 0.73 0.79 0.49 0.53 0.57 0.63
Table S8: Probability Estimates that SE and EA Prices are Lower under Entry at par
at Beginning of 1999Q1 for Alternative Exchange Rates
SE EA
Appreciation At par Depreciation Appreciation At par Depreciation
Year 10% 0% 10% 30% 10% 0% 10% 30%
1999Q1 0.21 0.27 0.32 0.43 0.25 0.18 0.13 0.06
Q2 0.59 0.33 0.15 0.02 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.09
Q3 0.82 0.48 0.18 0.01 0.19 0.14 0.10 0.05
Q4 0.73 0.44 0.20 0.02 0.17 0.13 0.09 0.05
2000Q1 0.71 0.44 0.21 0.03 0.18 0.12 0.09 0.04
Q2 0.71 0.41 0.17 0.02 0.18 0.12 0.08 0.03
Q3 0.68 0.39 0.17 0.02 0.19 0.13 0.08 0.03
Q4 0.65 0.37 0.16 0.02 0.20 0.13 0.08 0.03
2001Q1 0.61 0.34 0.15 0.02 0.21 0.13 0.09 0.03
Q2 0.58 0.33 0.15 0.02 0.21 0.14 0.09 0.04
Q3 0.56 0.32 0.15 0.02 0.22 0.14 0.09 0.04
Q4 0.55 0.32 0.16 0.03 0.22 0.15 0.10 0.04
2002Q1 0.53 0.32 0.16 0.03 0.23 0.15 0.10 0.05
Q2 0.52 0.32 0.17 0.04 0.23 0.16 0.11 0.05
Q3 0.52 0.32 0.18 0.04 0.24 0.17 0.11 0.05
Q4 0.51 0.33 0.19 0.05 0.24 0.17 0.12 0.06
2003Q1 0.51 0.33 0.20 0.06 0.25 0.18 0.13 0.06
Q2 0.51 0.34 0.21 0.07 0.26 0.19 0.13 0.07
Q3 0.51 0.35 0.22 0.07 0.26 0.19 0.14 0.08
Q4 0.51 0.35 0.23 0.08 0.27 0.20 0.15 0.08Table S9: Conditional Point Estimates of the Eﬀects of SE Entry on SE and EA Short-
Term Interest Rate, the SEK/Euro Rate and Eﬀective Exchange Rate under Entry at par
at Beginning of 1999Q1
Short-Term Exchange Rate (%)
Year Interest Rate (%) Spote Rate Eﬀective Rate
SE EA SEK/Euro SE EA
1999Q1 -0.38 -0.05 2.49 2.16 -0.17
Q2 -0.29 -0.08 5.88 5.00 -0.58
Q3 -0.86 -0.11 8.36 7.15 -0.72
Q4 -0.93 -0.13 10.16 8.84 -0.45
2000Q1 -0.83 -0.12 12.41 10.91 -0.24
Q2 -1.41 -0.15 13.83 12.44 0.41
Q3 -1.26 -0.17 15.70 14.40 1.18
Q4 -2.49 -0.23 17.00 16.07 2.40
2001Q1 -3.40 -0.29 18.64 18.11 3.79
Q2 -3.64 -0.33 19.82 19.71 5.22
Q3 -4.25 -0.39 19.05 19.73 7.03
Q4 -4.00 -0.41 18.71 20.03 8.62
2002Q1 -3.74 -0.38 19.20 20.92 9.88
Q2 -4.62 -0.36 17.97 20.62 11.93
Q3 -5.94 -0.36 16.51 20.46 14.74
Q4 -6.75 -0.36 17.40 22.15 17.03
2003Q1 -7.13 -0.40 17.70 23.03 18.79
Q2 -7.38 -0.45 17.57 23.38 20.19
Q3 -6.48 -0.39 19.10 24.79 20.75
Q4 -6.84 -0.34 17.61 23.88 22.10
Note: The point estimates are obtained conditional on the realised values of oil prices, US equity prices and US short
and long-term interest rates over the period 1999Q1-2003Q4. The ﬁgures for the interest rate are percent per annum.
Table S10: Conditional Point Estimates of the Eﬀects of SE Entry on SE and EA Output
and Prices under Entry at par at Beginning of 1999Q1
Output (%) Prices (%)
Year SE EA SE EA
1999Q1 0.14 0.06 0.12 0.10
Q2 0.26 0.11 0.08 0.18
Q3 0.33 0.13 0.06 0.29
Q4 0.45 0.12 0.11 0.45
2000Q1 0.51 0.12 -0.01 0.60
Q2 0.55 0.08 0.05 0.81
Q3 0.82 0.02 0.01 1.03
Q4 1.02 -0.03 0.01 1.33
2001Q1 1.58 -0.07 0.14 1.72
Q2 1.80 -0.05 -0.01 2.10
Q3 1.86 -0.04 -0.15 2.50
Q4 1.97 -0.03 -0.24 2.94
2002Q1 1.92 0.02 -0.49 3.31
Q2 2.08 0.02 -0.60 3.72
Q3 2.59 -0.04 -0.52 4.30
Q4 3.20 -0.01 -0.71 4.90
2003Q1 3.56 0.10 -1.06 5.50
Q2 3.62 0.17 -1.25 6.15
Q3 3.76 0.31 -1.66 6.70
Q4 3.39 0.35 -1.85 7.26
Note: The point estimates are obtained conditional on the realised values of oil prices, US equity prices and US short























































































































SE EAFigure S3: Probability Estimates that SE and EA Short-Term Interest Rates are Lower
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Figure S4: Probability Estimates that SE and EA Output is Higher under Entry at par
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SE EAFigure S5: Probability Estimates that SE and EA Prices are Lower under Entry at par
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Figure S6: Conditional and Unconditional Probability Estimates that SE and EA Output
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Note: The probability estimates are obtained conditional on the realised values of oil prices, US equity prices and US
short and long-term interest rates over the period 1999Q1-2003Q4.Figure S7: Probability Estimates that SE and EA Output is Higher under Entry at par
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Figure S8: Probability Estimates that SE Output is Higher under Entry at Beginning
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Entry at par 10% Appreciation 10% Depreciation 30% DepreciationFigure S9: Probability Estimates that EA Output is Higher under Entry at Beginning
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